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District Court No. 070902181 
Appellate No. 20090399 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff filed this appeal from the April 15,2009 Order of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Honorable Denise P. Lindberg, in which the district court dismissed 
Plaintiffs amended complaint to quiet title. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
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APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs amended complaint to 
quiet title which was premised, in part, on the district court's finding (i) that, based on the 
testimony of Plaintiff, Elizabeth D. Jolley did not have a present intent to convey the property 
when she executed the 1991 quit claim deed prepared by the bank and (ii) that the quit claim 
deed was only signed to get the line of credit, not to convey the property. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), the defendant in an action 
tried without a jury may, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, 
move for a dismissal on the ground that "upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown 
no right to relief" Rule 41(b) is "appropriately applied when the trial judge finds that the 
claimant has either failed to make out a prima facie case or when the trial judge is not 
persuaded by the evidence presented by the claimant." Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 
(Utah 1987). 
In reviewing involuntary dismissals under Rule 41(b), the court of appeals "must give 
great weight to the findings made and the inferences drawn by the trial judge, but must reject 
[the] findings if [the court of appeals] considers] them to be clearly erroneous." Southern 
Title Guar. Co. v. Betters, 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah App. 1988). Findings of the district 
court are "clearly erroneous" if they are against the clear weight of the evidence or if the 
court of appeals reached a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. To 
successfully challenge a finding of fact, "an appellant must . . . marshal all the evidence in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support 
the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Wilson 
Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P21, 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b): 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, 
has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving 
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for 
a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine 
them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on 
the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in 
Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a 
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, 
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack 
of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 41, attached as Addendum "M" to Plaintiffs Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves Robyn Hoggan's ("Plaintiff) attempt to claim an ownership 
interest in property owned by her former mother-in-law, Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner 
("Elizabeth"), now deceased. Elizabeth owned property located at 687 3rd Avenue, Salt 
Lake City, Utah (the "Property") that she was going to use to fund her retirement or to pass 
down to her seven (7) children {see, e.g., December 11, 1978 quit claim deed ("1978 Quit 
Claim Deed"), attached as Addendum "E" to Plaintiffs brief). In the meantime, however, 
-3-
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Elizabeth allowed Plaintiff and her husband, John D. Hoggan ("John"), Elizabeth's son and 
one of the Appellees, to live in the Property for a time on the understanding that the couple 
would renovate and repair the Property and pay the property taxes. 
In 1991, the couple arranged for a home equity line of credit; however, in order to 
qualify for the loan, Elizabeth was required to sign the loan and execute a quit claim deed to 
herself and to John. See Agreement for home equity line of credit, attached as Addendum 
"D" to Plaintiffs Brief. The bank prepared the quit claim deed and Elizabeth signed it. See 
October 21,1991 quit claim deed ("1991 Quit Claim Deed"), attached as Addendum "C" to 
Plaintiffs Brief. Plaintiff testified, in no uncertain terms, that at the time Elizabeth signed 
the quit claim deed, she did not intend to convey the Property. The purpose of the quit claim 
deed was to obtain the line of credit. 
The couple, not Elizabeth, actually borrowed and used the money. Consistent with 
their obligations, the couple used the funds to, among other things, complete certain 
renovations to the home. The couple also failed to timely pay the property taxes and 
consequently used some of the line of credit to pay back taxes. 
The Property was listed for sale and the proposed proceeds from the sale were to be 
divided 2/3 to Elizabeth and 1/3 to John and Plaintiff. The house did not sell and Plaintiff 
and John could not qualify to purchase the house. Elizabeth passed away in March of 2003. 
Before her passing, Elizabeth executed a will in which she stated that she intended to pass 
her interest in the Property to her children, with one third going to John. 
-4-
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Before Elizabeth died, Plaintiff filed a divorce petition on or about August 12,2002.! 
On February 7, 2007, Plaintiff also filed suit against the Appellees herein claiming that by 
virtue of the 1991 Quit Claim Deed, John owned the Property in fee simple. Plaintiff seeks 
to wrest an interest in the Property from Elizabeth's estate based on John's alleged ownership 
of the Property. The undersigned Appellees are Elizabeth's other children or representatives 
ofsuch. 
There is no dispute that the 1991 Quit Claim Deed was recorded before the previously 
executed 1978 Quit Claim Deed. That is not the issue. The issue is whether the trial court's 
decision to grant Appellees' motion to dismiss is supported by the findings made by the trial 
court. Among other things, the trial court found, by Plaintiffs own testimony, that Elizabeth 
did not have a present intent to convey the Property when she signed the quit claim deed in 
1991. The 1991 deed was only used to obtain the line of credit. The line of credit was used 
to fulfill Plaintiffs and John's obligations vis-a-vis the Property. Plaintiff is unable to 
marshal sufficient evidence to show that the findings of the trial court are insufficiently 
supported by the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner was the mother of seven children, including John Hoggan 
and the Appellees herein (or the representatives of such). Record at 240 & 244.2 Elizabeth 
1 See Hoggan v. Hoggan, Case No. 024905033 (3rd Dist. Ct, Salt Lake County). 
2 Citations to the Record, pages 232 through 249, are attached as Addendum "A" and 
Addendum "B" of Plaintiff s Brief. 
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owned two separate parcels of property: 1564 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and 687 
East 3 Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. The latter property is referred to hereinafter as the "• 
"Property." Record at 240. 
On December 11,1978, Elizabeth executed a quit claim deed. See Addendum "E" to 
Plaintiffs brief. In the 1978 Quit Claim Deed, Elizabeth conveyed her interest in the 
Property to her seven (7) children. Record at 244 & 246-47; Transcript at 28:4-12.3 
Plaintiff and John Hoggan were married in 197 8. Record at 240; Transcript at 16:12-
14. Due to the financial instability of the couple, Elizabeth allowed the couple to move into 
the Property in 1986. Record at 241 & 245. The couple had been previously living in € 
Elizabeth's other home. Record at 240. 
The deal that Elizabeth proposed to the couple was that they could live in the Property 
rent free if they maintained and repaired the house and paid the yearly property taxes. 
Record at 241 & 245. When the house was finally repaired, it was to be sold so that 
€ 
Elizabeth could use the proceeds to fond her retirement. See generally Record at 242. 
The couple lived in the house from 1986 to 2002. Transcript at 16:16 & 22-24. The 
couple was unable to qualify for a loan to purchase the house from Elizabeth. Record at 241. € 
In about 1991, the couple desired to obtain a home equity line of credit to help pay for 
repairs to the house and to cover back taxes. Record at 241 & 245; Transcript at 23:22-25 & 
24:8-12. The couple, however, was unable to qualify for financing on their own. Record at 
3 A copy of the Transcript is attached to Appellees' Addendum herein. ^ 
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241 & 245-46. Accordingly, John and Elizabeth visited the bank, where Elizabeth was 
required to sign a quit claim deed prepared by the bank which purported to convey the 
property to Elizabeth and John. Record at 241-42 & 245-46; Transcript at 18:5-9. Elizabeth 
was not represented by counsel when she signed the deed. Transcript at 18:10-13. 
The sole purpose of the 1991 Quit Claim Deed was to "get [the] equity line of credit." 
Transcript at 34:6-12. See also Record at 242 & 246. In open court, Plaintiff testified that at 
the time Elizabeth signed the quit claim deed, she did not have a present intent to convey the 
Property. Transcript at 34:13-15 ("Q: The purpose behind the quit claim deed was not to 
convey John the house? A: Not at that time, no.").4 See also Record at 242 & 246. 
Plaintiff also testified about the nature of the agreement allowing Plaintiff and John to 
live in the Property. Plaintiffs description of the arrangement illustrates why Elizabeth did 
not intend to convey the Property when she signed the quit claim deed: 
Q: Did you ever pay any rent? 
A: It wasn't—that was not ever set up for us. Our -
Q: So what was the agreement? 
A: The agreement was that we improve the home. 
Q: Okay, and s o -
A: And improve her assets as well as ours. 
Q: So that was the agreement? That gave you the right to live there, right? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: So it didn't give you ownership, right. It gave you the right to live there? 
No rent, correct? 
A: Correct. 
* * * 
Q: ... You were also going to pay the taxes, correct? 
4 See also id. at 41:6-8 ("Q: And you recognize that again this property was owned by Mr. 
Hoggan's mother? A: Yes."). 
-7-
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A: That's correct 
Q: That was part of the agreement? 
A: That's right, uh-huh (affirmative). 
Transcript at 32:3-14 & 33:12-16. See also id. at 35:10-20 (admitting responsibility to pay 
taxes but failing to do so); Record at 241 & 245. There was no purchase agreement between 
Elizabeth and Plaintiff and John. Id. at 31:15-21. 
None of the money from the line of credit went to Elizabeth. Transcript at 34:19-20. 
Some of it was used for repairs and to pay back taxes, which Plaintiff and John owed as 
consideration for living in the Property. Id. at 35:2-4; Record at 242.5 In 1995, the Property 
was listed for sale and if sold, the proceeds would have been divided between Elizabeth and * 
John and Plaintiff. Transcript at 43:25-44:13; Record at 243. 
On August 12,2002, Plaintiff filed a petition for divorce from John. Record at 243.6 
On March 2,2003, Elizabeth passed away. Id Although signed by Elizabeth much earlier, 
the 1978 Quit Claim Deed was not recorded until November of 2003. Record at 244 & 247; 
Transcript at 28:8-10. Prior to her passing, Elizabeth also executed a holographic will in 
which she provided for the distribution of the Property, stating "[i]f I still have the property at 
687 3rd Avenue, Salt Lake City, UT. With one third going to John Hoggan. He has improved € 
and lived in the house." Record at 244 & 246. 
5 Plaintiff denied that she refused to help John pay the back taxes because they did not 
own the house. Transcript at 39:15-40:7. 
6 Plaintiff admitted to extra-marital conduct. See Record at 243; Transcript at 37:1-16. ^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At the close of Plaintiff s case, Defendants moved to dismiss the case. The trial court 
granted the motion and in open court found, among other things, as follows: (i) when 
Plaintiff and John moved into the Property, they both knew it was owned by Elizabeth; (ii) 
Plaintiff and John were not required to pay rent, but they were required to improve the 
property and pay the taxes; (iii) there was no discussion of a purchase from Elizabeth; (iv) 
part of the line of credit was used to renovate the house and to pay taxes; and (v) the purpose 
of the 1991 quit claim deed was to assist Plaintiff and John in getting the line of credit, "not 
to convey the property." Transcript at 49:2-50:9.7 
ARGUMENT 
A- Plaintiff Testified that Elizabeth did not Intend to Convey the Property when 
She Signed the Quit Claim Deed to Facilitate the Home Equity Line of Credit 
A "presumption of valid delivery arises where the deed has been executed and 
recorded/' Kresser v. Peterson, 675 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984), but this presumption can be 
overcome by clear and convincing evidence. Gold Oil Land Development Corp. v. Davis, 
611 P.2d 711 (Utah 1980).8 The case, however, was not about the timing of deed 
recordation. The case turned on the purpose behind the 1991 Quit Claim Deed and the 
grantor's intent, and Defendants met their burden through the testimony of Plaintiff 
7 The facts and evidence consistent with the findings of fact and conclusions of law were 
also set forth in the April 15,2009 Order at Record 232-238. Appellees also refer the Court 
to the Order for additional support of the facts set forth above. 
8 What constitutes clear and convincing evidence is primarily for the trial court to determine. 
See Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958). 
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In Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984), the plaintiff argued that the deed was 
not delivered and accepted with the requisite legal intent and that at best it must be viewed to 
be a conveyance in trust. The Court confirmed that where a deed is executed with no intent 
to transfer a present interest, it will be invalidated by a court in equity.9 
Utah Courts have long held that a "conveyance is valid only upon delivery of a deed 
with present intent to transfer." See Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287,351 P.2d 959 (1960). 
In other words, "a conveyance is valid when the grantor, with present intent to convey, 
delivers the deed." Winegarv. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,110 (Utah 1991). SeeGivanv. 
Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287,290 (Utah 1960) (recognizing that conveyances are not effective 
until there is an actual delivery with intent to transfer ownership); Crowther v. Mower, 876 
P.2d 876, 879 (Utah App. 1994) ("A conveyance is valid upon delivery of a deed with 
present intent to transfer.");10 Warburton Family Trust v. Pedockie, 2000 Utah App. 272 
(2000) (intent to convey required). 
The crucial evidence before the trial court that sunk Plaintiffs case was the fact that 
9 The Baker Court also cited Curtiss v. Ferris, 168 Colo. 480,452 P.2d 38 (Colo. 1969), in
 f 
which the Colorado court also held that an intent to convey is required. Id. at 482,452 P.2d 
at 39 cited in Baker, 684 P.2d at 63 5. As recognized by the Curtiss court, "an Intent to pass a 
present interest is an essential element of delivery of property; and that when the evidence 
establishes that one does not intend to pass such a present interest in property that as between 
the parties there is no binding delivery even though the deed is recorded." Id. (citing Am. 4 
Jur. 2d Deeds §§ 81 & 82). Stated another way, the prima facie evidence of delivery that 
arises from recording may be rebutted by evidence showing a lack of intent to transfer a 
present interest in the property. Id. at 483,452 P.2d at 39. 
10 In Crowther, the intent to convey the property was corroborated by the mom's codicil that 
stated she had, by quit claim deed, given her son one-half of her home and property. * 
-10-
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Elizabeth had no actual intent to convey the Property. The only purpose of the 1991 Quit 
Claim Deed was to "get [the] equity line of credit." Plaintiff and John then used the line of 
credit to fulfill their obligations to Elizabeth to improve the property and pay the taxes, which 
were both in lieu of rent. 
Plaintiff endeavors to argue that Defendants failed to carry their burden of proof in 
challenging the efficacy of the 1991 Quit Claim Deed. In reality, the only thing that Plaintiff 
did was cite the standard of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the quit claim 
deed was not effective and then conclude that Defendants failed to carry that burden. 
However, it was Plaintiffs own testimony that satisfied any burden of Defendants with 
respect to the vitality of the 1991 Quit Claim Deed. 
Because Plaintiff is unable to attack the evidentiary basis for the trial court's findings 
about the purpose and effect of the 1991 Quit Claim Deed, Plaintiff instead belabors a point 
that is not disputed by the parties; namely, that Elizabeth executed the 1991 Quit Claim Deed, 
which was prepared by the bank to enable John to obtain the home equity line of credit, and 
that the 1991 Quit Claim Deed was recorded after it was signed. These facts are not 
disputed. 
It is also not disputed that Elizabeth executed a previous quit claim deed conveying 
the Property to her children in 1978, and that this deed was not recorded until 2003.n 
11 The trial court also found that John and the children had actual knowledge of the 1978 
Quit Claim Deed and that the deed was apparently delivered to John before 1991. Transcript 
at 51:8-23. 
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Further, it is not disputed that Elizabeth executed a holographic will before she died. The 
will stated that she was leaving her interest in the home to her children, the beneficiaries. 
This will was executed by Elizabeth years after she signed the 1991 Quit Claim Deed. These 
material facts are not in dispute. 
What Plaintiff fails to appreciate is the significance of the fact that she, through her 
own testimony, personally provided the evidentiary basis upon which the trial court 
concluded that the 1991 Quit Claim Deed was not effective to convey the Property. In no 
uncertain terms, Plaintiff testified that Elizabeth did not have the present intent to convey the 
property when she signed the 1991 Quit Claim Deed, "not at that time, no." 
Without a present intent to convey the property, the 1991 Quit Claim Deed did not 
pass title. Since Plaintiff scuttled her own case, Defendants were not required to put on 
additional evidence of Elizabeth's intent. The evidence before the trial court more than 
sufficiently supported the trial court's findings and conclusions. The trial court's decision 
was not clearly erroneous. 
B, Plaintiff Failed to Marshall all the Evidence and to Demonstrate the Evidence 
was Legally Insufficient to Support the Trial Court's Findings. 
To successfully challenge a finding of fact, "an appellant must. . . marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court 
below." Wilson Supply Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P21, 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 
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2002).12 In W. Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991), the court 
stated as follows: 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting 
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The 
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the 
court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Mat 1315. 
Plaintiff argued that "the evidence before the trial court did not show by clear and 
convincing evidence that Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner did not intend to convey to Defendant 
John Hoggan an interest in the real property at issue...." Plaintiff, however, failed to marshal 
all the evidence to demonstrate that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. 
First of all, Plaintiff failed to marshal the following facts: (i) that Elizabeth did not 
have the assistance of counsel when she signed the 1991 Quit Claim Deed, Transcript 18:10-
13; (ii) that Plaintiff and John were actually obligated to pay taxes on the Property in lieu of 
rent, Transcript 33:10-16; (iii) that some of the loan proceeds were in fact used to pay back 
taxes, Transcript 35:2-9; and (iv) that Plaintiff controverted allegations that she refused to 
help pay the taxes because the couple did not own the house, Transcript at 39:15-40:7.l3 
12 See also L, W. Wolfe Enters, v. M<L Nat'I Golf L.R, 165 Md. App. 339, 343 (2005) ("If 
there is any competent and material evidence to support the factual findings of the trial court, 
those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous."). 
13 Subpart (iv) is relevant to the inquiry because the line of questioning may have borne on 
Plaintiffs credibility and the trial court was best positioned to judge credibility. 
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commenced an action to claim an interest in the Property. 
When ail the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the findings of the trial 
court, the conclusion is inescapable: Elizabeth did not intend to convey the property when 
she signed the 1991 Quit Claim Deed. The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Plaintiff failed to marshal evidence showing that the trial court's findings 
were clearly erroneous (i.e., that there was no intent to convey the Property and that the 
purpose of the 1991 Quit Claim Deed was to obtain the line of credit), the Court should 
affirm the trial court's dismissal of the case. 
DATED this p j B day of January 2010. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Brett N. Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
December 3,2008 Transcript of the Bench Trial before the Honorable Denise Lindberg. 
All other relevant documents were previously attached to Plaintiffs Brief. 
-17-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1^002 
CA — t N a ^ ^ 0 ^ ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROB YN MICHELLE HOGGAN, 
Plaintiff 
v 
RANEE BOLEY FLEMING, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 070902181 LM 
With Keyword Index 
BENCH TRIAL DECEMBER 3, 2008 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG 
FIUBIMSTfllcr COURT 
Tturd Judicial District 
JUN !0 2009 
SAW UKE COUNT* 
Deputy Claffc 
CAROLYN ERICKSON,CSR HLEO 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIT^^H APPELLATE COURTq 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
80,-523! .86 Q l X ) ^ ? ^ ' 
JUN 12 2009 
4A 
— ^ - N O - ^ O ^ 0 > j ii\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
<goo3 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
John Hoggan: 
All others: 
SAMUEL JVL BARKER 
JEFF CALLS 
Attorneys at Law 
MATTHEW N. OLSEN 
BRETT N. ANDERSON 







ROBYN MICHELLE HOGGAN 
Direct Examination by Mr. Barker 
Cross Examination by Mr. Olsen 
Cross Exatnination by Mr. Anderson 
Redirect Examination by Mr. Barker 
Re-cross Exarnination by Mr. Olsen 













Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1^004 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - DECEMBER 3, 2008 
JUDGE DENISE P. LINDBERG 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Please be seated and thank you. Please 
excuse .the late start. I had problems getting in. I usually 
try not to keep people that long or at least to call them and 
let them know that there's something that's come up, but I 
had forgotten my cell phone at the office. So I could not 
even do that- So I do apologize. 
We are on the record in the matter of Robyn Hoggan 
vs. Ranee Fleming, et al. If I could please have counsel 
state your appearances. 
MR. BARKER: Sam Barker and Jeff Calls here for 
plaintiff, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay* 
MR. OLSEN: Your Honor, Matt Olsen on behalf of 
John Hoggan. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. ANDERSON: Brett Anderson for the rest of the 
names of defendants - the beneficiaries, Your Honor. 
TH£ COURT: All right, thank you. All right. 
Today is set for a bench trial in this matter. I had not 
received any trial memoranda, per se, from anybody. I have 
review - I did review the witness lists and the exhibits that 
were submitted. I received these from the defendants. I 
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didn't receive anything else from anybody else; is that 
correct? 
MR. BARKER: Your Honor, we were hoping that our -
one of our runners yesterday dropped off a trial brief for 
you, but evidently -
THE COURT: I did not receive anything, -
MR. BARKER: Okay. 
THE COURT: - and I was here til almost 6:30 last 
night. So... 
MR. OLSEN: Your Honor, I have just prepared for 
the Court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
which I have submitted this morning. 
THE COURT: Okay, Those have not made it to my 
file either. 
MR. ANDERSON: And, Your Honor, as a matter of 
course we've been adopting and incorporating the submissions 
of defendant John Hoggan -
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ANDERSON: - which have similar interests and 
just kind of aligning ourselves with them. 
THE COURT: Okay, all right. I just wanted to make 
sure that whatever had been submitted, you know, sufficiently 
in advance so that I could review it. But to let you know 
that I have reviewed what I've got in front of me, obviously 
there's some things that apparently have not made their way 
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to me yet. All right. Well, with that, let's get started. 
MR. OLSEN: Your Honor, could I first request that 
we invoke the exclusionary rule of anybody that is not a 
party that would be testifying today be excluded from the 
courtroom, and I only have one witness. That would be Carol 
Tamose. 
THE COURT: Okay. The exclusionary rule has been 
invoked, and what that means is that we want to receive the 
testimony of all the people who are going to be testifying. 
We want to receive it without the taint of having heard other 
people's testimony. We want to know just what you know and 
what is the information that you can provide, and so I'm 
going to ask all of you that anticipate testifying at any 
point in these proceedings to step outside. And then when 
your testimony is needed, we will call you. Okay? 
MR. BARKER; Your Honor, that would not include the 
parties, correct? Any of the parties of - there will be 
parties testifying, but I believe that they should be allowed 
to stay. 
THE COURT: If they're named parties, they can 
stay. Anybody else can stay out - will need to stay out. 
MR. BARKER: Your Honor, just to give you a brief 
history of this case. These parties were Mr. and Mrs. 
Hoggan. John Hoggan and Robyn Hoggan weire married in 1978. 
In 1986, they moved into Mr. Hoggan's mother's home on Third 
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Avenue. The home had been previously used as a rest home and 
needed a lot of work - a lot of problems with the home.. it 
really was a - it needed a lot of - just a lot of attention 
to itr and they moved in in 198 6* And in 198 6, they began 
repairing this home- The home was all paid off, and so they 
worked on the -
THE COURT: Was it just the two of them, or was 
Mrs. Hoggan - Mr. Hoggan's mother -
MR. BARKER: Just the two of them, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, 
MR. BARKER: And so from - and in *86 they started 
making repairs on this home. And up until - in October 1991, 
John Hoggan, Robyn Hoggan, and Mr. Hogganrs mother, Elizabeth 
Gardner, obtained a home equity loan from America First 
Credit Union. And at that time in 1991 - in October of 1991, 
Mr. Hoggan's mother, Elizabeth Gardener, executed a quit 
claim deed to John Hoggan granting John Hoggan and Mrs. 
Gardner, herself, as joint tenants of the property with 
rights of survivorship. This was done in October of -
October 22nd, 1991, and it was recorded one day later, 
October 23rd, 1991. So because of that equity, home equity 
loan, John Hoggan and Robyn Hoggan were able to get money -
get loans from the credit union to make the extensive repairs 
that were still nieeded on this home. Robyn Hoggan and John 
Hoggan were both liable for the loan. So if anything 
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happened to either one, the other would have to pay the loan 
off. To this day, there's still about $11,000 owing on this 
America First Credit loan that both parties are liable on. 
But for years, and years, and years, Your Honor, they had 
this kind of revolving line of credit. They had a $25,000 
limit* They would use money, pay it back, and then get more. 
For years, and years, and years, they would take money out 
and then do repairs on this house* 
Your Honor, unfortunately things between John 
Hoggan and Robyn Hoggan did not work out. In August of 2002, 
Robyn separated from John and filed for divorce. On March 
2*d, 2003, Your Honor, Elizabeth Gardner died. And under the 
quit claim deed with rights of survivorship, John Hoggan 
should have owned the home at that time - the Third Avenue 
home at that time. Now, in November of 2003 eight months 
after Mrs. Gardner's death, John Hoggan recorded a quit claim 
deed that was dated December 11th, 1978, and this deed gave 
all the children -
THE COURT: I'm sorry. When was that date? 
MR. BARKER: December llcb, 1978. So it's about 13 
years before the 1991 -
THE COURT: Right, but when was it recorded, 
MR. BARKER: It was not recorded, Your Honor, until 
November - I think it was November 19rh of 2003, and that's 
eight months after Mrs. Gardner's death. 
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THE COURT: Right. 
MR. BARKER: And this deed of 1978 gave all 
children of Elizabeth Gardner the Third Avenue property as 
tenants in common. 
THE COURT: Right-
MR, BARKER: And so, Your Honor, during this trial, 
we will show that the 1978 deed is not valid, because there 
was never any delivery. Delivery we will show is of the 
utmost importance when you convey, and this never happened 
with this 1978 deed- And then we can - of course, we can 
show that we believe by the x91 deed that Mrs. Gardner did 
convey to John Hoggan as a tenant - as a joint tenant with 
rights of survivorship, and we will also show that the 
attempt by defendants to claim a right to the property is for 
the purpose - we have a divorce action still going. The 
parties still aren't divorced, and we will show that this 
attempt to - by defendant to claim a right - defendants to 
claim a right to the property is for the purpose of keeping 
petitioner from receiving any equity at all in the marital 
home that she lived in for 17 years, and put a lot of money, 
and sweat equity in. So our position, Your Honor, - and 
we're asking today that the *78 deed be declared invalid, and 
the *9l deed be declared a valid deed, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay-
MR. BARKER: Thank you very much. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. OLSEN: Your Honor, again, I think this is 
probably one of those cases where I think our facts are all 
pretty clear. I think we all recognize what the facts are. 
I think counsel's basically outlined. But I think what's 
important in this case, Your Honor, is what we really have 
historically is we have a home that was initially owned by 
Mr. Hoggan and the family who are parties of this action. 
This home was owned by their grandmother originally. Then 
subsequently went to ownership of Mr. Hoggan's mother, and 
Mrs. Hoggan maintained - or Mr. Hoggan's mother maintained 
ownership of this property. 
What basically counsel represents - that in 1986, 
again, these parties did move into this house. Prior to 
that, they were living in another house that mom lived in, 
and basically mom was allowing them to live in that, but -
and the understanding was they could live in there as long as 
they maintained it and so forth. When they moved into the 
Third Avenue property, the understanding was going to be that 
they would move into this property and for what their rent 
would be, Your Honor, they would maintain the property, 
number one. And then number two, .they'd pay the taxes on the 
property, arid that was what their rent was going to be. 
What basically happened, and I don't think there's 
any dispute in regard to this also. That in 1991 there was a 
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determination made by the parties that they need to make some 
additional repairs to the property,*and again this is part 
again of their rent in maintaining or staying in that 
property, that they needed to make some repairs on this 
property to make it more livable because of the ages of their 
children and so forth. So what happens is, againf my client 
attempts to have mom loan the money to make the repairs, but 
mom doesn't have the ability to come up with the money 
necessary* So again what happens is - that basically Mr, 
Hoggan and his mother go to the America First Credit Union to 
obtain a loan to make repairs to the property. Now, at that 
point in time, Mrs. Hoggan wants, I guess, to be on the loan 
obligation- She wants to be on the property* But againf Mr, 
Hoggan's mother was unwilling to put her name on the 
property, and so again, at that point in time, she wants to 
be on the loan. She is placed on the loan. 
But what happens, Your Honor, is because Mr- Hoggan 
and his mother are both signers on the promissory note, the 
credit union places the property in the name of Mr, Hoggan 
and his mother for the purpose, of again, obtaining the loan 
and for that purpose only. There was no intent, at that 
point in time, to convey to Mr. Hoggan an interest in the 
property- It was for the purpose of obtaining a loan so that 
they could make the necessary repairs on this property. So 
that's in 1991 when that occurs. 
8 
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Mrs- Hoggan in 1997, Your Honor, executes a 
holographic will and in that will, she basically again 
reiterates the fact that she owns that property because what 
she says in there is that again if she should die or 
something should happen, then Mr, Hoggan should receive a 
third of that property. Also within that will she says that 
again, if there's any monies left over from the Third Avenue 
property, those monies would be used to pay her debts and 
obligations. 
THE COURT: She also says, if I still own the 
property at Third Avenue. 
MR. OLSEN: Which again, she does at her death, 
Your Honor. At the time of her death, she ~ 
THE COURT: Well, I mean, that language calls -
suggests that she has some questions about it. 
MR. OLSEN: Right. 
THE COURT: If she has ah ownership there. 
MR. OLSEN: Right. And so again, what we're here 
to do today is, Your Honor, basically to show to this Court 
that again in 1991, it never was her intent to convey the 
property to Mr. Hoggan. Her intent was so that they could 
get a loan to make some improvements to the property-
Now, what happens with that loan over the years is, 
again, they continue to draw on it, not necessarily for 
improvement, Your Honorr basically to live on and so forth. 
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But what the parties do is then for that time period, they 
make some improvements to the property. They draw on that 
loan- And then, again, in 2002, Mrs. Hoggan leaves the 
marriage. She basically becomes involved with another 
individual, and she leaves the marriage. And after the 
marriage, again - then Mr. Hoggan's mother passes away. So 
now again at the time of the separation, again Mr. Hoggan's 
mother again clearly maintains an interest in the property. 
Our concern in this case, Your Honor, is that again 
is that Mrs. Hoggan, at least, comes before this Court having 
not yet had determined really what her interest is in this 
property. She's coming in basically saying there may be an 
interest that I may have in this property potentially if the 
divorce court basically determines that Mr, Hoggan may have 
an interest. I mean, there's so many arguments, even within 
the divorce action, that would have to be dealt with, whether 
it was inheritance and so forth, Your Honor, but she comes 
before the Court requesting whether she is even is before 
this Court today withstanding to be able to come in and say, 
I want this title clear, because I may potentially have a 
claim on this property. 
Our position is after six years of litigation of a 
divorce action, something should have occurred, at least by 
her, to go in and have the divorce action say, you know what, 
you're entitled to one-half of whatever Mr. Hoggan's interest 
10 
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in. That has not occurred. Still hasn't occurred, and so 
therefore, we question whether she even has the ability to 
come before this Court and now say, Court void that deed, 
because I may, I may potentially have an interest in the 
property. And again I think the case law provides that again 
she has to be able to show that she has a substantial 
interest in that property by way of some legal form. Her 
name's never been on a deed. Again, I think sherll 
recognize, and the testimony will be today she always 
recognizes that property was mother-in-law's. They did not 
own that property, but that was her mother-in law's and the 
witnesses will say that throughout the years, she was always 
concerned about that. 
So it's our position that what we believe the 
testimony will show today, Your Honor, is that again that 
there was no intent to convey the property to Mr. Hoggan in 
1991. And that again in and by through her will, her intent 
was that her children were to share that property with 
exception of again Mr. Hoggan was to receive one-third 
interest in the -
THE COURT: Okay. So what is your position with 
respect to the *78 will? Not will, but deed? 
MR, OLSEN: We believe it's a valid deed. Your 
Honor, We believe it was delivered. And the testimony will 
show today that it was delivered to my client, and the case 
11 
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law also provides, Your Honor, that again - in order to 
basically void that later deed, they have to be able to show 
that there was a purchase of this property, and I don't think 
today theyrre going to be able to show that this property was 
ever purchased by Mr* Hoggan. Under the law and if the Court 
was to read statute, the statute is clear that there has to 
be a purchase, and there never was a purchase. The case law 
also provides that again under joint tenancy, it does not 
create a purchaser in the property. There's case law that 
says that. So that again, basically the *78 deed is the deed 
that holds today with exception again the deed after the 
fact. 
THE COURT: M l right. 
MR. OLSEN: So our position is again the *78 deed 
is a valid deed, and again never was her intention to convey 
the property to Mr. Hoggan. And that again basically Mrs. 
Hoggan really has never participated really, Your Honor, in 
regard to wanting this property, cause she always recognized 
that it wasn't her property, and we believe that's what the 
testimony will show today. Does the Court have any other 
questions? 
THE COURT: No, that's good. 
MR. OLSEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. ANDERSON: Just real briefly, Your Honor. 
12 
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Not to belabor what's already been said, but we 
would only add that the evidence today will also show that 
the intent of Ms- Gardener or Elizabeth was that the property 
would be fixed up and then sold, and then the proceeds would 
be one-third would be given John, and two-thirds would be 
given to her remaining siblings - I mean, her children as she 
had requested, which I think the evidence will then show to, 
Your Honor, that the language in the will of "if I still have 
it" contemplates that the property was intended originally to 
be sold, and that would explain what Ms. Hoggan was think -
or Ms. Gardner was thinking when she drafted her holographic 
will. We would also show - the evidence will show that Ms, 
Gardner - Ms« Eliz - or Ms. Elizabeth Gardner did not request 
that this quit claim deed be prepared. It wasn't something 
that she went into her attorney and said, I want a conveyed 
title of this property to my son, John. So will you prepare 
a deed? It was something that the bank - the credit union 
had prepared and was presented to the parties at the time of 
signing. The evidence will also show that Ms. Gardner was 
not savvy in the terms of real estate dealings and what all 
these terms may have meant. And all of this bears on the 
fact that did she intend to convey ownership at the time that 
the deed was signed and recorded, which I don't dispute that 
it was recorded, and I don't believe they were disputing that 
it was signed* The interesting issue was, was there an 
13 
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intent to convey the ownership interest. The evidence will 
show that there was not. 
And one thing that I would - and it's kind of like 
proving a negative, Your Honor, that in this case where 
plaintiffs are relying upon formalities, the evidence will 
show there were no formalities with respect to a contract for 
the sale of the home as referenced by Mr* Olsen. There was 
no real estate purchase contract. There was no other sort of 
writing memorializing any sort of purchase of the home by 
John or Robyn Hoggan from Ms. Gardner, and we believe that 
all these things will show, Your Honor, there was no intent 
to convey, and that the intent of Ms. Gardener was that the 
parties could live in the house, fix it up, sale it, and then 
disburse the proceeds as she desired. And itrs also 
important to realize that the evidence will show that Ms. 
Gardner intended, if she was still alive, to fund her 
retirement through the sale of that home. And that if there 
were proceeds leftover, then those assets upon her death 
would have been given to her children. So that's the lay of 
the land as it may be. 
THE COURT: I'm having a difficult time, and maybe 
I'm hoping that at some point you all figure out how to bring 
good evidence for me to be able to resolve the question of 
whatever expectations Ms. Gardner may have had in writing the 
holographic will, I have - after reviewing the exhibits, I 
14 
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have some questions to whether she had anything to convey. 
It seems to me that if I accept Mr. Olsen's argument, that 
the appropriate and binding deed was the ^78 deed. Then at 
that point, she conveyed all her interest to everybody. And 
there's nothing else for her to convey, and whatever her 
expectations were in the holographic will, there are 
expectations that had no legal basis. Anyway, that's - as I 
was reviewing the exhibits that I received yesterday, that 
was a concern that came up for me. 
MR- ANDERSON: And, Your Honor, I believe that 
evidence will be presented today that will try to explain 
what Ms. Gardner's intent was with respect to that earlier 
deed, and with respect to her husband that she had married 
after the death of her first husband and her concerns about 
how her property needed to be left with her family and not 
something that could be obtained by his family, and maybe 
that could shed some light as to what she was intending to 
do. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you-
MR. BARKER: Robyn Hoggan, Your Honor-
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Hoggan, please come forward 
and be sworn in. 
MS, HOGGAN: Do I go here, ma'am? 
COURT CLERK: Raise your right hand, please. 
/// 
15 
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1 I ROBYN MICHELLE HOGGAN 
2 | Having first been duly sworn, testified 
3 1 upon her oath as follows: 
4 COURT CLERK: Have a seat, please. 
5 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. BARKER: 
7 I Q Robyn, could I get you to state your full name for 
8 | the record, please? 
9 | A Robyn Michelle Hoggan* 
10 | Q And you are the wife of John Hoggan, correct? 
11 | A Yesr I am. 
12 | Q And just give us a brief history* When did you and 
13 | John get married? 
14 | A July 14th, 1978. 
15 | Q Okay, and when did you separate from John? 
16 | A On August 2Ed, 2002, I was asked to leave the home. 
17 | Q Okay. And as of today, are you divorced from John, 
18 | or are you still married? What's your status today? 
19 I A I'm still married. 
Q All right• Now, I just want to switch [inaudible]. 
this - as you know, this litigation is about the Third Avenue 
home. Can I ask you, when did you begin living in the Third 
Avenue house? 
A We moved in in 1986. 
25 I Q '86? 
1.6 
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Okay, and who owned the home in 1986 when you moved 
To my knowledge, it was Elizabeth Gardner. 







A Yes, it was-
Q All right, and can you just tell us briefly what 
condition the home was in when you - was it in good 
condition, or was it habitable or -
A No- It was in terrible condition. Actually, it 
had been a nursing home, and it wasn't safe for my kids to be 
on the floor and in certain parts of the house. 
Q Okay. So in *85 - 19 - or *86, I'm sorry, when you 
moved in, did you do anything at that time to try to fix the 
home up? 
A In 19 - from 1986 when we moved in? 
Q Right. 
A Yes. We started making repairs immediately. 
Q All right. And eventually in 1991, you're aware -
again, we've all talked about this in opening statement about 
the *91 quit claim deed. Did you have any part of that? 
A Yes, I did. I was there. 
Q Okay, and you said you were there. Where did this 
happen? 1991 - this is five years after you had been living 
17 
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in the house? 
A Right* 
Q What happened in 1991? What - with the quit claim 
deed, if you can explain? 
A Well, John and I went, and we picked up Elizabeth, 
and we went that day and took all the measures that we needed 
to do to accomplish taking care of the deed as well as going 
to the credit union and signing that - the equity line of -
or the equity loan. 
Q Do you recall if Mrs, Gardner had an attorney with 
her at that time? 
A I don't recall if she had an attorney there at that 
time* I just know we were all together the whole time* 
Q Okay, And at the time that the - of the executing 
of the quit claim deed, did you, yourself, sign any 
documents? 
A Yes, I did. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. BARKER: This exhibit here - I forgot we had one 
more attorney. So I apologize. 
Your Honor, I have- one here for each of you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BARKER: I'll just go off memory here. 
Q (BY MR. BARKER) All right. Robyn, I'm showing you 
whatrs been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and ask you if 
you can identify this exhibit? 
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COURT: Okay. This is the same as -
BARKER: These are the number -
COURT: - I guess, Mr. Hoggan's Exhibit 6? 
BARKER: Correct, Your Honor. 
COURT: Okay. This is plaintiff's one? 
WITNESS: I need my glasses. 
BARKER: Oh. 
WITNESS: Thank you. 
MR. BARKER) Again, Mrs. Hoggan, if you can 
look at Exhibit 1 there.and read it over and tell me if you 
can identify the document. 
A Qh-huh (affirmative). Yeah, I can. 
Q And what is it? 
A It's a quit claim deed. 






, it is. 
BARKER: Your Honor, we offer Plaintiff's 
OLSEN: I have no objection. Only the exhibit 
is Defendant's Exhibit 4 also-
THE COURT: Plaintiff's 1 will be admitted. And in 
that case, you don't object to having defendant's - oops, 
let's see. That's not defendant's six. 
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MR. OLSEN: Six, Excuse me. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: it's defendant's 4. 
MR. BARKER: No. No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:. Okay. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 4 
received) 
Q (BY MR. BARKER) Now, Robyn, that exhibit you have 
in front of you, can you just list to us - just state what it 
states here on the front. How Mrs. Gardner - how she 
conveyed her land? What it states? 
A Just read from the top? 
Q Well, just from the part where it just talks about 
what she's conveying. 
A Okay. "Elizabeth Jolley a.k.a. Elizabeth Jolley 
Gardner and John D. Hoggan, a married man, as joint tenants, 
but not tenants in common with full rights of survivorship-" 
Q Okay. That's good. Now, let me - your yourself, 
signed another document, right? At the time of -
A Yes, I did. The same day, uh-huh (affirmative)• 
MR. BARKER: Here* Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay-
Q (BY MR. BARKER) Robyn, I'm showing you -
THE COURT: And again, this is the same as - well, 
at least this one is the same as Exhibit 5 of -
MR. BARKER: So we'll have no objection of Exhibit 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
121024 
5, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR. BARKER) And, Ms* Hoggan, I just handed you 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and ask you if you can identify that 
document* 
A Yes, I can. 
And what is that? Do you recall? 




Q Okay. Now, I want you to look at the second page 
of that agreement. 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Who - when you say, all signed. Who -
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q - signed it? 
A John Hoggan, Robyn Hoggan, and Elizabeth Gardner. 
Q Okay. I want you to go back to the front page* 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. BARKER: First of all, I want to offer this. 
We offer, Your Honor, Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 and -
THE COURT: Exhibit 2 will be admitted. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 received) 
Q (BY MR* BARKER) Robyn, I want you to look down in 
the middle of that front page of the document there. It 
says, security• 
A Uh-huh (affirmative)* 
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Q Can you read what it says on the security line 
there on this document you all signed? 
A Yes. "This agreement is secured by a deed of trust 
security instrument upon property, the collateral, which you 
own, and now occupy, and continue to occupy as your principal 
residence," 
Q So you, and John, and Mrs. Gardner at that time 
signed this document stating that all three of you owned this 
property, right? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And again, this was done on the date that you went 
in-
A October 22nd. 
Q Okay. And the other defendants in this matter, 
John's siblings, did they sign off on this document at all? 
A No. They were not there. 
Q Okay- And once you signed this document, were you 
able to get a home equity line of credit? 
A Yes, uh^huh (affirmative). 
Q Okay, 
A Yeah. 
Q And under the home equity line of credit, were you 
obligated to pay money if you borrow money? Were you 
obligated on there to pay the money back? 
A Absolutely, uh-huh (affirmative). 
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Q Okay. And do you know as of today - and that's the 
second document there with this group. 
A Oh-huh (affirmative)« 
Q Do you know today if there's still any money owing 
to America First Credit Union? 
A Yes, there is. 
Q And -
A There's - it's $11,844.33 as of last month. 
Q Okay. And again, if something were to happen to 
Mr* Hoggan -
A Uh-huh (affirmative). I am responsible for that. 
Q You'd have to pay; is that right? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative), yes, 
Q And you're not living in the house anymore, 
correct? 
A No, I'm not. 
Q Okay. And did Mrs. Gardner pay any money on this 
loan? 
A No, she did not. 
Q And then can you tell the Court - tell us the 
reason - what was the reason you had to go and get a home 
equity line of credit for the Third Avenue property? What 
was your purpose in doing that? 
A We needed to make further improvements to the home. 
That's why we did that. 
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Q Okay. And so from *86 up to *91, was it - if I 
recall your testimony, you had been making steady 
improvement, but you needed more extensive money for more 
improvements; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And just to - just again just - the home was a -
what? Was it a rest home? Is that what it was? 
A Yes. It had been a nursing home. It needed -
well, actually, you know, led us to the equity line and why 
we needed so much at one time was that it needed a new roof 
really bad* I mean, it was past that point. We needed to 
put a roof on immediately and make some immediate repairs. 
Q Okay, and so there - it needed a new roof? It 
needed some extensive repairs; is that right? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative)« 
Q So you were - were you continuously borrowing from 
this home equity line or -
A Yes, uh-huh (affirmative)- We topped it out right 
away, and then continued to make -
Q Okay* Well, did you have a job during this time, 
1986 to 2002? 
A Yes. 
Q During that period, were you working? 
A Yeah. I worked the full length of the marriage -
the full 24 years I have held a job* Part time most of the 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
@028 
time- I didn't, you know, go full time until my kids were 
more in high school. My oldest was in high school, and so I 
always brought in an income and contributed- All of that 
went into a joint checking account where John and I shared, 
and all of my income, which I calculated, was over $180,000 
from 1985 through 2002, it was contributed into that income, 
which a good deal of that went into the home as well* 
Q Okay. Was there any - I guess, you call it sweat 
equity also, and did you -
A Absolutely. 
Q - work on the house without paying -
A Absolutely* 
Q Okay. Can you just tell the Court some of the 
things you did on -
A Uh-huh (affirmative), sure* On my own, I was - I 
wallpapered. I painted walls- I painted trim. I - I'm a 
seamstress, and so I furnished the home with draperies, and 
curtains, and blinds that would have cost thousands of 
dollars - up to thousands of dollars. When - of course, you 
know, being a female and I can't do everything on my own. Of 
course, I assisted John with all the cleanup, preparations-
We worked elbow-to-elbow -
Q Okay* 
A - on most of the things that happened in that home. 
Elbow-to-elbow. 
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Q Now, since this was rest home, did you - was there 
like sprinklers -
A Oh, it was - yes. When we first moved in, it was 
in terrible condition. It looked somewhat - the floors were 
like what you would see in an old warehouse or something - in 
a - I'm trying to think what - old K-Mart is what comes to 
mind. But tiles, hundreds of tiles, and we had to scrape 
those off with spackle knives, I guess, they're called, I 
don't know. And we scraped all those off, and then those had 
all been glued down. And then there was like a particle 
board, and we had to break that up. Then we - when we broke 
that, that had all been nailed - or and stapled down. So 
there were thousands of those in the floor, and we had to 
pull those off with pliers, and there was tar paper in 
between these layers as well. And so having to be very 
careful so that we could preserve the hardwood floors, which 
we eventually finished. 
Q Now, you - I think you testified that you put a lot 
of money into this - fixing this house up, and you had, of 
course, had to pay the home equity line back? 
9 
A Uh-huh (affirmative)• 
Q Did any of the other defendants, besides John, in 
this matter - did they help on any of these improvements, or 
did they contribute money toward this house at all? 
A I'm sorry. Can you -
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1^030 
Q Did any of the other defendants in this matter -
the - John's siblings, did they give you any money or 
contribute toward -
A None, no. 
Q Did they come help do any of the -
A No. 
Q - sweat equity work? 
A Nor none- John and I - this came from all of our 
own money. 
Q Okay- And the house, I assume, had taxes due on 
it? Who would pay the property taxes on the home? 
A The property taxes came from John and I* 
Q Did you have any homeowner's insurance or anything 
on the house? 
A Yes, we did, 
Q And you maintained - you and John maintained that? 
A Yes, we did- CJh-huh (affirmative) . 
Q Okay. And did John ever tell you ever that there 
was a prior quit claim deed prior to the 1991 quit claim deed 
that gave John joint tenancy with rights of survivorship? 
A No. I'd never heard of anything like this or seen 
anything about that until 2005. I think an attorney of mine 
had told me about it-
Q Okay. So you never - that was never brought up at 
all? 
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MR. BARKER: Your Honor, my last exhibit here. I 
think this is one of defendant's exhibits as well. 
Q (BY MR. BARKER) Robyn, I just showed you what's 
been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 and ask you if you can 
identify that exhibit. 
A Uh-huh (affirmative), yes. It's a quit claim deed. 
Q Okay, and this is a quit claim deed that was 
recorded in November of 2003; is that right? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Okay, but you see when it was drawn up or signed by 
Mrs. Gardner down below, that was December of 1978, correct? 
A That's correct, 
MR* BARKER: Okay. Your Honor, we offer 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. 
THE COURT: Okay. Plaintiff's 3 will be admitted, 
and again that is the same as - it looks like defendant's 3. 
MR- OLSEN: We have no objection. 
THE COURT: Okay. So both will be admitted. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 and Defendant's 
Exhibits 3 received} 
MR. BARKER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR, BARKER) Robyn, when's the first time you 
saw this Exhibit 3, this deed? 
A In 2005. 
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Q And you had already filed for divorce by 2005 when 
you first saw this, right? 
A Yes, in 2002. 
Q From 1986 when you moved in up until 2005, did you 
even hear any talk about there was another deed, or the house 
was going to be awarded to somebody else or -
A Never. 
Q Did you and John ever have any conversations about 
the house and how it was going to be - who was going to be 
the owner of the house? 
A Yes. I always expressed a, you know, worry- I'm a 
worrier by nature. I'm born that way, I worry about 
everything and because - you knowr I just - I would express 
that to him, and he would reassure me, and smooth my head, 
and tell me that it's okay. The home is ours. Itrs set up 
that way. My mom has taken care of that, and you don't need 
to worry about it. 
Q Okay. So this worried you, and you asked him 
continually about the house, and he would reassure you? 
A Yeah. 
Q And you heard ~ there was some talk about there's 
no consideration for John receiving -
THE COURT: Counsel, can you please not lead your 
witness? 
Q (BY MR. BARKER) When Mrs. Gardner conveyed the -
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1 and I think we've been over this. I don't - I'll just be 
2 quick. When Mrs. Gardner conveyed the joint tenancy over to 
3 John, again this was so you could get a loan, and you ended 
4 up having to pay a lot of money. 
5 Sorry, Your Honor. I think we'll move on. I think 
6 I've already established that fact. 
7 But again, when did you - you separated in what 
8 year? 
9 A 2002. 
10 Q Okay, and so there was talk in the opening 
11 statement that you've been dragging your feet on this divorce 
12 Case; is that true? 
13 A That is not true. 
14 Q Okay. And as a matter of fact, the case did get 
15 I dismissed, right, for lack of prosecution? 
16 A Yes, and I would like to express my frustration. I 
17 appeared many, many times - at least six times in a courtroom 
18 by myself where the opposing side did not show up for 
19 hearings, 
20 Q Okay. So this is not something you're dragging 
21 out? 
22 A No. 
23 Q And is this house - if it were - if it's decided 
24 that John is the owner of the house, is that - if you get the 
25 equity in the house - have you received any - are you going 
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to get anything else from this divorce? Was there any other 
assets? 
A Nothing. 
Q Was there any retirement? 
A None, He always promised me this would be our 
retirement, and that was his plan-
MR. BARKER: Okay. That's all I have for nowf Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q Mrs, Hoggan, you make an issue about the fact that 
again nobody else has made any improvements to this property. 
Have any of these other family members lived in this 
property, or did they live in this property for 16 years? 
A No. 
Q Did they have the right and use of enjoyment of 
this property for the last 16 years? 
A No. 
Q And, in fact, did you not enjoy the use of this 
house from 1986 until 2002? 
A Did I enjoy the use of it? 
Q Correct, right. 
A I lived there, 
Q And so again, you had the right to live there? You 
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1 had the right to enjoy it with your family? 
2 I A Yes. 
Q Did you ever pay any rent? 
A It wasn't - that was not ever set up for us. Our -
Q So what was the agreement? 
A The agreement was that we improve the home. 
Q Okay, and so -
A And improve her assets as well as ours. 
Q So that was the agreement? That gave you the right 
to live there, right? 
A That's correct. 
Q So it didn't give you ownership, right? It gave 
you the right to live there? No rent, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q So again, may I ask youf do you have any 
documentation today that would show in any way that you ever 
purchased this property? 
A There wasn't a purchase agreement. 
Q So there's nothing - there was no agreement to ever 
purchase this property; is that correct? 
A Not to purchase it. 
Q And, in fact, this house was placed for sale at one 
time. Do you remember that? 
A Of course. 
Q And what was the understanding if that house sold? 
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A That we would split. 
Q So your understanding was that it was going to be a 
split? You didn't understand it was going to be a third to 
you, and that the two-thirds to your mother-in-law? 
A That was never told to me, no. 
Q So again, that was again to be further compensation 
for what you had done to the house; is that correct? 
A Yes. With us putting all of our incomes into it, 
of course. 
Q Okay. So again, the understanding was you had the 
right to live there with the - by the - again, you were going 
to make improvements? You were also going to pay the taxes, 
correct? 
A That's correct, 
Q That was part of the agreement? 
A That's right, uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Now, I'm going to ask you to look at your Exhibit 1 
right there, and that's the quit claim deed. Do you see that? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you see anywhere where your name appears on 
that? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Where does your name appear? 
A I'm John Hoggan's wife. 
Q Okay. I'm going to ask you to look at - what's the 
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date on that document? When was that dated? 
A The 22n<* of October. 
Q Okay, and then look over on Exhibit 2. When is 







The 22ad of October • 
So what was the purpose of the quit claim deed? 
So that we could get our equity line of credit. 
So you could get the equity line of credit? 
Uh-hiih (affirmative). 
That' s what the purpose was behind the quit claim 
deed; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q The purpose behind the quit claim d^Bd' was not to 
convey John the house. 
A Not at that time, no. 
Q Okay. Let me ask you this. You had a $25,000 line 
of credit; is that correct? 
A That's correct-
Q Did any of that money go to your mother-in-law? 
A No. 
Q And, in fact, did some of that money go for your 
personal use, you and John's personal use? 
A Not that I'm aware of. 
Q So you're not aware that it went to pay bills, to 
send the children on trips, and things like that? 
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A No. 
Q Were you aware of the fact that again that some of 
that money was used to pay back taxes? 
A Yes. 
Q So you - so this is 1991. You moved in 1986. Itrs 
not 1991, and you hadn't even fulfilled your responsibility 
there by maintaining the taxes; is that correct? 
A We were paying the taxes out - this was part of the 
reason is that we were behind on our taxes. 
Q So again, the understanding was to you and John 
living in the house was that you were going to maintain it, 
and you were going to pay the taxes? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q So by 1991, you hadn't even done that; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q So, in fact, you have to go in and get this loan so 
that you can fulfill what your responsibility was to your 
mother-in-law to maintain the taxes on it, correct? 
A Uh^huh (affirmative). 
Q Now, may I ask you? Look on that - you've noted 
that, again something on that Exhibit 2. I'm going to ask 
you to turn to that back page of Exhibit 2, Now, again, does 
your name personally again - I'll ask you that question. 
Does your name personally appear on that deed of trust? 
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A On number two? 
Q C o r r e c t . 
A Yes . 
Q Do you see anywhere where your name personally 
appears? Do you see Robyn Hoggan on that at all? 
A In - oh, written inside this? 
Q On the deed of trust, the home equity line of 
trust? 
A Yes. 
Q Again, look at the last document on that exhibit if 
you would for me, please? 
A I'm sorry. I see a signature on the first page, 
and then my name's on the -
Q Again, but your attached deed of trust which is a 
separate document -
A Oh, I'm sorry. 
Q Do you see anywhere where your name personally 
appears on that? 
A Not Robyn Hoggan, no. It does say a married man, 
though, and I was married to him. 
Q Okay* 
A I am married to him. 
Q So - and again, as I understand, you separated then 
in August of 2002? 
A Yes • 
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Q And again, the reason you separate was because you 
were involved with somebody; is that correct? 
A Absolutely not. 
Q Were you involved with somebody in 1989 - or 1998? 
A Yes, 
Q Okay, and that was the first time, right? 
A For three months. 
Q Okay. And again, then and again were you not 
involved with somebody in the Grand America in -
A No. 
Q - 2002? 
A No. Absolutely not. 
Q So again if John find things in your purse and 
things like that it had nothing to do with it? With your 
relationship with a gentleman at the Grand America? 
A I have ho relationships -
MR. BARKER: I object, Your Honor. That's 
irrelevant to the quiet title action. 
MR. OLSEN: Let me -
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (BY MR. OLSEN) Let me ask you this. You separated 
to leave in 2002, and you've had a divorce proceeding going 
for six years; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q How many sets of counsel have you had in that 
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1 divorce proceeding? 
2 A How many what? 
3 Q How many sets of counsel? How many different 
4 attorneys have you had in that divorce proceeding? 
5 A I've had four. 
6 Q Okay. And in that divorce proceeding, has anybody 
7 ever filed a certificate of readiness for trial? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And again, have you ever again had a trial in this 
10 matter, in your divorce action? 
11 A No, because of the surprises. 
12 Q Has any court ever determined that again you have 
13 an interest in this property in your divorce action? 
14 A I didn't understand the question• 
15 Q In your divorce action, has any court entered any 
16 order that you have any interest in this property or any 
17 interest of Mr. Hoggan's in the property? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Is there an order that you can show me today? 
20 A I don't have one with me, no. 
21 Q Is there one there? 
22 MR. BARKER: Your Honor, I object. The reason 
23 we're here is to determine this. I just don't know the 
i » 
24 relevance here. 
25 MR* OLSEN: The relevance is again, Your Honor, is 
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a standing issue whether she can come in before this Court 
and say, hey, I want to clear this title, because I may have 
an interest in Mr. Hoggan's at some point in time, and then 
that's what the line of questioning is, whether again if 
anybody's ever determined whether she has any interest,, even 
if Mr. Hoggan does have an interest. 
THE WITNESS: Sir, I was married for 24 years, and 
every -
MR. OLSEN: The question is again -
Q (BY MR. OLSEN) Mrs. Hoggan, again I'm just asking 
you, do you have any order of the court in your divorce 
action that says that you have an interest in that property? 
A I don't have a court orderr no. I have the home 
equity line. 
Q Do you remember in - you say that again all your 
money went into this property. Do you remember in 1999, Mr. 
Hoggan asking for some help to pay again the back property 
taxes? 
A I don't recall him asking, no. 
Q You don't remember there being again $13,000 owed 
now eight years later because the taxes hadn't been paid? 
A In 1999? 
Q In 1999, 1988 - 1998/99? 
A Oh, I remember us struggling. We worked very hard. 
We didn't make a lot of money* 
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Q Do you ever remember telling Mr. Hoggan that you 
weren't going to pay any property taxes? 
A No, I don't recall ever saying that. 
Q Do you remember ever telling Mr* Hoggan you're not 
gong to pay anything on this property because you don't own 
it? 
A No. I don't recall ever saying that. 
Q Do you have anything to date, Mrs. Hoggan, that 
would basically show this Court that you own this property? 
A The only thing I have to show is an equity line and 
a deed. 
Q When was the last time you paid anything on the 
home equity lone? 
A When I left or was threatened out of the home in 
2002. 
Q And again do you have anything today that you can 
show this Court where you paid anything on this home equity 
line? 
Yes, I do. 
Do you have it here? 
Yes, I do. 








No. It's on my desk. 
You recognize that again Mr. Hoggan has other 
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Q And you recognize that again he's got sisters and 
they're making a claim to this property? 
A I understand. 
Q And you recognize that again this property was 
owned by Mr. Hoggan's mother? 
A Yes -
Q And you recognize that again that Mrs- Hoggan's 
passed away - John's mother passed away after your divorce 
action was filed? 
A Yes-
Q You had been separated at that point in time? 
A Yes. 
MR. OLSEN: That's all I have right now, Your 
Honor-
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MR. ANDERSON: I think -
THE COURT; 0hf I'm sorry. Go ahead, counsel. 
Nowr did t - before counsel comes up, did I 
understand you to say that, acknowledge in response to a 
question by Mr. Olsen that you have not paid anything on the 
home equity line of credit since 2002? 
THE WITNESS: Since I was forced out of the home, 
yes. 
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THE COURT: You may proceed* 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ANDERSON; 
Q Ms. Hoggan, you testified that you did not - your 
name did not appear on the quit claim deed dated October 
22nd, 1991, correct? 
A Not my physical name, no-
Q And at the time the deed was dated, you did not 
have an ownership interest in that home, correct? 
A No, 
Q And you referred to a home equity line of credit, 
and answered a question by your counsel regarding this line 
entitled security about halfway down the first page. If you 
can refer to that? 
A Oh-huh (affirmative). 
Q You testified that - or your read the lines that 
stated that you owned and occupied the property? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Isn't it true, Mrs. Hoggan, at the time you signed 
this home equity line of credit that you did not own the 
property? 
A We owned the property. The deed had just been 
changed and it was into our names now* 
Q Was it in - it wasn't into your name, though, 
correct? 
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A John Hoggan. 
Q It was in John's name? 
A Elizabeth and John, yes. 
Q And not yours? 
A Yes. 
Q And so at the time you signed this home equity line 
of credit, you did not, in fact, own the property, though 
referenced that you did? 
A I have to say that because it says John Hoggan, a 
married man, that I would never have signed and been 
responsible for something that I was not going to benefit 
from in [inaudibleJ. 
MR, ANDERSON: I move to strike. Itfs non-
responsive and ask that the witness answer the question, that 
she did not personally own this property at the time she -
THE COURT: Please. 
MR, ANDERSON: - signed the home equity line of 
credit* 
THE COURT: Please answer just that question. 
THE WITNESS: Okay, I'm sorry. Repeat that. 
Q {BY MR. ANDERSON) That you did not actually own or 
have, an ownership interest in the property at the time you 
signed this home equity line of credit? 
A No, i did not. 
Q You testified that the house was actually listed to 
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be sold, correct? 
A At one time. 
Q And that the proceeds from the sale of the house 
would have been split? 
A Yes, 
Q Who would have been the recipients of the proceeds? 
A John and I, and - would have split and Betty - or 
Elizabeth. 
Q And, in fact, the listing occurred in approximately 
1995, correct? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Which was four years after the quit claim deed? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. ANDERSON: I think those are the only questions 
I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. 
MR* ANDERSON: Those -
THE COURT: Could you restate your last question? 
MR. ANDERSON: That the house was listed four years 
after the quit claim deed -
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
MR. ANDERSON: - in 1995* 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, BARKER: 
Q Rabyn, I just want to ask you a few followup 
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questions. Now, you were asked whether your name appeared on 
any of these documents, and you were asked to look at the 
home equity line trust deed. And again, let me ask you a 
question. In 1991 - October, 1991 the trust deed says, 
Elizabeth Jolley also know as Elizabeth Jolley Gardner and 
John Hoggan, a married man, as joint tenants. 
A Uh-huh (affirmative)-
Q Now, it says a married man. In 1991, you were 
married to John, right? 
A I'm married, yes. 
Q Okay* So your name is not on there, but John here 
listed as a married man, right? 
A Yes. 
Q And again, you haven't paid anything since 2002 on 
the home equity line, but you haven't lived in the house, 
right? 
A That's right. 
Q And you're still liable on the document,, right? 
A That's right. 
Q And again, I want to - I think we're just a little 
confused here. There was never an agreement - you said there 
was never an agreement for you to purchase the house, but you 
were going to get the line of credit, fix it up, and then 
sale the house, but that never - you never did sell it? 
A No. 
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Q Do you know why that never happened? 
A We fell in love with the home. We fell in love 
with the home, and his mom knew it. And she was okay with 
it, and we just stayed-
Q Okay and - okay. So you didn't - and you kept -
did you keep making improvements on the home from -
A Yes. We continued. 
Q Okay. And again, I think you misstated this, but I 
don't - how much do you think of yourself of putting into 
this house over those years? How much money? 
A I have - all my W-2's I have figured over ?180,000. 
Q Okay. And again, that doesn't include the sweat 
equity also, right? 
A No, that does not, 
MR. BARKER: Can I have just one moment, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BARKER: That's all I have, Your Honor. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. OLSEN: Just briefly. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. OLSEN: 
Q Again, Ms. Hoggan, you say you've got W^2's for 
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$180,000. Clearly, all that money you've earned during that 
period of time didn/t go to this house? 
A No, not into the home, into the family and into the 
home, 
THE COURT: Okay* You cannot break out what 
portion of that went into the home? 
THE WITNESS: No, cause it went into a joint 
account. 
THE COURT: And you have living expenses? 
THE WITNESS: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: All right. Any other questions? 
MR. BARKER: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, thank you. You may 
step down. 
THE WITNESS: Shall I leave these here? 
THE COURT: Yes, please* 
MR. BARKER: Your Honor, plaintiff rests at this 
time, and we - I do have a copy of our trial brief if you'd 
like to have it or is there a recess or anything, or -
THE COURT: Sure. Do you have supporting case law? 
MR. BARKER: I do. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BARKER: May I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have a copy of the 
supporting case law with you? 
47 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ta w o . 
1 MR. BARKER: Oh, We have some cases, Your Honor, 
2 but I don't believe we have them all. I apologize. I can 
3 get them here real quick, though. 
4 THE COURT: It's okay. All right. 
5 MR* OLSEN: I don't think it has anything to do 
6 with this, but I almost - as I've listened to the testimony 
7 we've heard so far today, I think basically we've heard what 
8 basically we need to prove, and I think that, number one, 
9 she's testified that she has no interest in the property. 
10 Number two, that I think she's testified that the purpose 
11 behind the quit claim deed, which we have said throughout, 
12 was to obtain the loan. It wasn't - her own testimony was 
13 that it was never intended to convey title, and I think that 
14 again thatrs where our case is. I mean if the Court wants 
15 us, we can parade all these witnesses on, but I think she's 
16 already admitted today, again, the evidence that we would 
17 intend to prove before this Court today. 
18 So I'm almost to the - almost asking a motion to 
19 dismiss at this juncture to alleviate another potentially 
20 six, seven, eight witnesses that would basically testify what 
21 she's already testified to today, that again that the deed in 
22 1991 was never intended to convey property to Mr. Hoggan, 
23 that the purpose was to obtain the loan, and that's what -
24 again, we need to establish today, and I think she's admitted 
25 | under her own testimony today that that's what the purpose 
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was. 
THE COURT: I'm inclined to agree. I think the 
testimony is from Ms. Hoggan that at the time they moved into 
the home, that she understood that the home was owned by Mr. 
Hoggan's wife - mother; that there were - there was an 
agreement reached between them that would not require them to 
pay rent, but to work to improve the residence and that that 
presumably would be in lieu of what would have otherwise been 
a rental agreement, or there was no discussion of a purchase 
of a, you know, option to purchase even included in here, at 
least based on her testimony«, Part of the agreement was that 
they would pay taxes. How they improved the home was 
essentially up to them. They had an obligation to improve 
the home in lieu of rent, to pay those taxes. it looks like 
that they weren't even able to - they put in effort into the 
home, but there is some indication by the testimony, her 
admission, that the tax obligation - at least part of that 
went - of the quit claim deed - of the home equity went 
towards paying that obligation. She admitted that there was 
no purchase agreement that had been negotiated with them. 
She admitted that the purpose behind the 1991 quit claim deed 
was to assist them to get the loan, not to convey property. 
Although, she indicated that she had expressed 
concern that the house was not in her name, the reality is 
that she either accepted her husband's representations, but 
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her husband's representations were not necessarily those of 
the title owner, and there's no testimony or evidence that 
she made any direct arrangements with the owner, "Elizabeth. 
To the extent that her expenses or her earnings -
some portion of those undefined amount went into the 
upgrading of the home, that would have been - which are not 
specifically broken out from regular living expenses - that 
would have been only in fulfillment of the agreement to 
occupy and improve the house* 
On these facts, I do not see that plaintiff has 
established that she has a claim of right, which is what you 
need to have to quiet title, a claim of right on the title -
a colorable claim, and I see no indication based on the 
testimony that there was ever a clear expectation that this 
was in exchange for property ownership into which this would 
be a marital residence as a marital asset. So your Rule 41 
motion is granted. 
MR. OLSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. Ifll prepare 
that order". 
THE COURT: Okay, and would you please prepare 
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. You 
have leave to supplement to - in case I did not cover orally 
everything that would be necessary to be - to sustain that 
judgment. You have leave to augment the record from the 
evidence -
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MR. OLSEN; Let them do the -
THE COURT: - in the record. 
MR, OLSEN: Okay. 
TIJE COURT: And I guess that's it. 
MR. OLSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. BftRIER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Recording stopped at 10:19:38, on at 10:19:46) 
THE COURT: - documents. My sense is that the A91 
deed was never intended to convey anything, and, in fact, I 
don't know that the *91 deed really conveyed to Mr, Hoggan 
anything because as between parties, I think the law is clear 
that there does not need to be consideration for the 
execution of the deed- As to - as between parties who have 
knowledge, even if it wasn't recorded until after the fact, 
there was a delivery of the deed to, apparently, John Hoggan, 
of the x18 deed. And at that point from where I sit, 
Elizabeth had signed away all her interest, and there was no 
further interest that would have been transferrable on her -
by her part if the *78 deed is valid which I believe that as 
between parties, the law is pretty clear that it is, even 
without recordation and with people who have actual knowledge 
of it, which would be Elizabeth and all the children- That 
was all she had to give. So..» 
MR. OLSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. BARKER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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MR. ANDERSON: Thank you. Your Honor. 
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